

WHEN CAN A PRIOR BE RECOVERED FROM A POSTERIOR?

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1. Strict Conditioning.

Let \mathbf{A} be an algebra of subsets of a set Ω of possible states of the world. Suppose that you are given a finitely additive probability measure (henceforth, “probability”) q on \mathbf{A} , and are told that q has come from some probability p on \mathbf{A} by conditioning on the event E . Can you determine p ? Well, yes, if $E = \Omega$ (in which case, it must be true that $p = q$), but not if E is a proper subset of Ω . For given the fully specified posterior q , along with E , there exist infinitely many priors that yield q by conditioning on E . Here’s why: Choose any number $\nu \in (0,1]$ and any $\omega \in E^c$. Define the probabilities m_ω (called the *point mass at ω*) and p_ν for each $A \in \mathbf{A}$ by

$$(1.1) \quad m_\omega(A) = 1 \text{ if } \omega \in A \text{ and } m_\omega(A) = 0 \text{ if } \omega \notin A, \text{ and}$$

$$(1.2) \quad p_\nu(A) = \nu q(A \cap E) + (1 - \nu)m_\omega(A \cap E^c).$$

It is straightforward to check that m_ω and p_ν are indeed probabilities on \mathbf{A} . Furthermore,

$$(1.3) \quad p_\nu(A | E) = \frac{p_\nu(A \cap E)}{p_\nu(E)} = \frac{\nu q(A \cap E)}{\nu} = q(A \cap E) = q(A),$$

since $q(E^c) = 0$ and, hence, $q(A \cap E^c) = 0$.

2. Jeffrey Conditioning.

With Ω and \mathbf{A} as above, suppose that $\mathbf{E} = \{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$ is a *measurable partition of Ω* (i.e., a set of nonempty, pairwise disjoint events in \mathbf{A} , with union equal to Ω), where $n \geq 2$. Suppose that you are given a probability q on \mathbf{A} , and you are told that q has come from some probability p on \mathbf{A} by Jeffrey conditioning (henceforth, “JC”) on \mathbf{E} , i.e., that for all $A \in \mathbf{A}$,

$$(2.1) \quad q(A) = \sum_{i=1}^n e_i p(A | E_i)$$

for some probability p such that $p(E_i) > 0$, $i = 1, \dots, n$, with each $e_i (= q(E_i)) > 0$, and $e_1 + \dots + e_n = 1$. It is easy to check that a formula of type (2.1) holds with the posited conditions if and only if

$$(2.2) \quad q(A | E_i) = p(A | E_i) \text{ for all } A \in \mathbf{A}, \text{ and each } i = 1, \dots, n.$$

Condition (2.2) is variously termed the *rigidity*, *sufficiency*, and *invariance*. Can p be recovered from q , along with knowledge of the values e_1, \dots, e_n and the fact that q has come from p by JC on \mathbf{E} ? Again, no. To take a simple illustration, suppose that $\Omega = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, $\mathbf{A} = 2^\Omega$ (the set of all subsets of Ω , $E_1 = \{1, 2\}$ and $E_2 = \{3, 4\}$. Let $q(\{1\}) = 1/9$, $q(\{2\}) = 2/9$, $q(\{3\}) = q(\{4\}) = 1/3$, extending q to the remaining subsets of Ω in the obvious way. We may construct infinitely many probabilities p_ν on \mathbf{A} , such that q comes from p_ν by JC on $\{E_1, E_2\}$ with $q(E_1) = e_1 = 1/3$ and $q(E_2) = e_2 = 2/3$. For each $\nu \in (0, 1)$, let $p_\nu(\{1\}) = \nu/3$, $p_\nu(\{2\}) = 2\nu/3$, $p_\nu(\{3\}) = p_\nu(\{4\}) = (1-\nu)/2$. It is easily checked that each p_ν has the desired property.¹

Exercise. Let q be a probability on an algebra \mathbf{A} of subsets of the set Ω , and let $\mathbf{E} = \{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$ be a measurable partition of Ω , with $q(E_i) = e_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$. Let f_1, \dots, f_n be any sequence of positive real numbers such that $f_1 + \dots + f_n = 1$. For all $A \in \mathbf{A}$, let

$$(2.3) \quad p_{(f_i)}(A) = \sum_{i=1}^n f_i q(A | E_i).$$

Then q comes from $p_{(f_i)}$ by JC on \mathbf{E} , with $q(E_i) = e_i$, $i = 1, \dots, n$.

3. An Alternative Parameterization of Jeffrey Conditioning.

Let Ω , \mathbf{A} , and $\mathbf{E} = \{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$ be as above, and let p be a probability on \mathbf{A} such that $p(E_i) > 0$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$. Let u_1, \dots, u_n be any sequence of positive real numbers, and consider revising the prior p to a posterior q by the formula

$$(3.1) \quad q(A) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i p(A \cap E_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i p(E_i)}, \text{ for all } A \in \mathbf{A}.$$

It is straightforward to check that the set function q is indeed a probability on \mathbf{A} . Moreover, initial appearances notwithstanding, formula (3.1) furnishes no new and exotic method of probability revision. For, for all $A \in \mathbf{A}$, and $j = 1, \dots, n$,

$$(3.2) \quad q(A | E_j) = \frac{q(A \cap E_j)}{q(E_j)} = \frac{u_j p(A \cap E_j)}{u_j p(E_j)} = p(A | E_j).$$

So q simply comes from p by JC on \mathbf{E} . But what do the parameters u_i represent? Recall that if q is a revision of the probability p and A and B are events, then the *Bayes factor* $\beta_p^q(A : B)$ is simply the ratio of the new odds on A against B to the old such odds, i.e.,

$$(3.3) \quad \beta_p^q(A : B) = \frac{q(A)/q(B)}{p(A)/p(B)}.$$

When q comes from p by conditioning on E , then $\beta_p^q(A : B)$ is simply the *likelihood ratio* $p(E|A)/p(E|B)$.

Exercise. From formula (3.1) it follows that, for all $i, j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$,

$$(3.4) \quad \frac{u_i}{u_j} = \beta_p^q(E_i : E_j)$$

Interestingly, given a posterior q , the partition \mathbf{E} , the parameters u_1, \dots, u_n , and the fact that q has come from some probability by JC on \mathbf{E} , this information determines a *unique* prior p satisfying formula (3.1), namely the probability p defined for all $A \in \mathbf{A}$ by

$$(3.5) \quad p(A) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i^{-1} q(A \cap E_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i^{-1} q(E_i)}.$$

It is straightforward to check that (3.5) implies (3.1). But there is more work to be done to show that p , as defined by (3.5), is the *only* prior that yields q by means of formula (3.1). For this we must show that (3.1) implies (3.5).

From (3.1) and its consequence (3.4),

$$(3.6) \quad \frac{u_j}{u_1} = \beta_p^q(E_j : E_1) = \frac{q(E_j)p(E_1)}{q(E_1)p(E_j)}, \text{ and so}$$

$$(3.7) \quad p(E_j) = \frac{u_1 q(E_j) p(E_1)}{u_j q(E_1)}, \text{ whence}$$

$$(3.8) \quad \frac{p(E_j)}{p(E_1)} = \frac{u_1 q(E_j)}{u_j q(E_1)}.$$

Summing each side of (3.8) from $j=1$ to $j=n$ yields

$$(3.9) \quad \frac{1}{p(E_1)} = \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{u_1}{q(E_1)} \frac{q(E_j)}{u_j} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{u_1 q(E_i)}{u_i q(E_1)}, \text{ whence}$$

$$(3.10) \quad p(E_1) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{u_i q(E_i)}{u_i q(E_1)} \right)^{-1},$$

and substituting the right-hand side of (3.10) for $p(E_1)$ in (3.7) yields

$$(3.11) \quad p(E_j) = \frac{u_j^{-1} q(E_j)}{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i^{-1} q(E_i)},$$

which establishes (3.5) when $A = E_j$.

But by (3.2), $p(A | E_j) = q(A | E_j)$ for all $A \in \mathbf{A}$ and $j = 1, \dots, n$. So

$$(3.12) \quad p(A) = \sum_{j=1}^n p(E_j) p(A | E_j) = \sum_{j=1}^n p(E_j) q(A | E_j) = \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{u_j^{-1} q(E_j) q(A | E_j)}{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i^{-1} q(E_i)} =$$

$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i^{-1} q(A \cap E_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n u_i^{-1} q(E_i)}.$$

Remark. Special cases of formula (3.1) occur in Field (1978), where

$$(3.13) \quad u_i = G_i := \left(\prod_{j=1}^n \beta_p^q(E_i : E_j) \right)^{1/n},$$

and Jeffrey and Hendrickson (1988/89) and Wagner (2002), where

$$(3.14) \quad u_i = B_i := \beta_p^q(E_i : E_1).$$

References

1. Hartry Field (1978), A note on Jeffrey conditionalization, *Philosophy of Science* **45**: 361-367.
2. Richard Jeffrey and Michael Hendrickson (1988/89), Probabilizing pathology, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **89** (Part 3), 211-225.

3. Carl Wagner (2002), Probability kinematics and commutativity, *Philosophy of Science* **69**: 266-278.

Notes

1. For every finite $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n\}$, and any probabilities p and q on 2^Ω for which $p(\{\omega_i\}) > 0$ and $q(\{\omega_i\}) > 0$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$, it is (trivially) the case that q comes from p by JC on $\mathbf{E} = \{E_1, \dots, E_n\}$, where $E_i = \{\omega_i\}$ and $e_i = q(\{\omega_i\})$. That is, each positive probability q on 2^Ω comes from *every* positive probability p on 2^Ω by JC on \mathbf{E} . In such cases q obliterates all traces of the prior p from which it came by JC, including any nontrivial information about the conditional probabilities $p(A | E_i) = q(A | E_i)$, which take only the values zero and one here.