

Logical Notation and Terminology

A. There is a confusing variety of notation and terminology appearing in textbooks on logic, proof, and discrete mathematics. As a guide to reading other texts and articles, I have listed below the logical notation employed in our text, along with alternative notations that you may encounter elsewhere:

<u>Symbol employed in our text</u>	<u>Alternative notations</u>
1. \wedge	& AND .
2. \vee	OR
3. \rightarrow	\supset IF ____ THEN
4. \leftrightarrow	\equiv IFF
5. $+$	XOR
6. $ $	\uparrow NAND
7. \downarrow	NOR
8. \subseteq	\subset
9. \subset	\subsetneq
10. \setminus	$-$ (I often use this symbol, which is easier to write.)
11. \neg	\sim (I often use this symbol, which is easier to write.)

B. One unusual feature of our text is that no mention is ever made of the concept of the *complement* of a set. In our text, the notion of the *set difference* $B \setminus A := \{x \mid x \in B \wedge x \notin A\}$ is taken as fundamental. Then the complement of the set A is simply the set $U \setminus A = \{x \mid x \notin A\}$, where U is the universal set. Note that since *every* x under discussion is assumed to be an element of U , it is not necessary (although it would not be incorrect) to write $U \setminus A = \{x \mid x \in U \wedge x \notin A\}$.

The more standard treatment takes the notion of the complement of a set as fundamental, defining the complement A^c of the set A by: $A^c := \{x \mid x \notin A\}$, and then defining the set difference $B \setminus A (= B - A)$ for any sets A and B by: $B \setminus A := B \cap A^c$. It is nice to have the notation A^c available so that one can state the most familiar form of De Morgan's laws for sets (see Notes on Logic and Proof II, 1.). There are of course generalizations of these laws that hold for set differences in general, namely,

- (i) $C - (A \cap B) = (C - A) \cup (C - B)$, and
- (ii) $C - (A \cup B) = (C - A) \cap (C - B)$.

3. The symbols \Rightarrow and \Leftrightarrow . In some discrete mathematics texts, the symbol \Rightarrow is (incorrectly) used in place of \rightarrow , and the symbol \Leftrightarrow is (incorrectly) used in place of \leftrightarrow . It represents a very serious conceptual error to do this. The symbols \Rightarrow and \Leftrightarrow do not denote connectives, but, rather, relations between statements.

If P and Q are propositions, $P \Leftrightarrow Q$, which is read “ P is equivalent to Q ,” asserts that the propositions P and Q are true in exactly the same circumstances. The assertion $P \Leftrightarrow Q$ is either true or false, period. There is no such thing as a truth table for \Leftrightarrow , because only connectives have truth tables, and \Leftrightarrow is not a connective. There is, however, a connection between \Leftrightarrow and \leftrightarrow . Suppose that P and Q are wffs of propositional logic (also known as *propositional forms*). In this context, “ P and Q are true in exactly the same circumstances” simply means that P and Q have identical truth tables. But by the truth table for \leftrightarrow , P and Q have identical truth tables precisely when the proposition $P \leftrightarrow Q$ is a tautology. So here is the connection between \Leftrightarrow and \leftrightarrow :

If P and Q are wffs of propositional logic, $P \Leftrightarrow Q$ precisely when $P \leftrightarrow Q$ is a tautology.

The author of our text, aware of the fact that people often confuse \Leftrightarrow and \leftrightarrow , has chosen never to use the symbol \Leftrightarrow at all, always using the phrase “is equivalent to” instead. But the symbol \Leftrightarrow is ubiquitous in mathematical writing, and one really needs to learn to use it correctly, so I will make use of it all the time in my lectures and notes. To help keep the two distinct, let us agree always to read $P \Leftrightarrow Q$ as “ P is equivalent to Q ,” and $P \leftrightarrow Q$ as “ P if and only if Q .”

If P and Q are propositions, $P \Rightarrow Q$, which is read “ P implies Q ,” asserts that in any circumstance in which P is true, Q is also true. (Although the author of our text mentions “ P implies Q ” as one way of expressing $P \rightarrow Q$ in words, let us agree to use “implies” only in connection with \Rightarrow , always reading $P \rightarrow Q$ as “if P , then Q .”) The assertion $P \Rightarrow Q$ is either true or false, period. There is no such thing as a truth table for $P \Rightarrow Q$, because only connectives have truth tables, and \Rightarrow is not a connective. There is, however, a connection between \Rightarrow and \rightarrow . Suppose that P and Q are wffs of propositional logic (also known as *propositional forms*). In this context, “in any circumstance in which P is true, Q is also true” simply means that the truth tables of P and Q have the property that whenever a line in the truth table of P takes the value T, that same line in the truth table of Q also takes the value T. But by the truth table for \rightarrow , this will be the case precisely when the proposition $P \rightarrow Q$ is a tautology. So here is the connection between \Rightarrow and \rightarrow :

If P and Q are wffs of propositional logic, $P \Rightarrow Q$ precisely when $P \rightarrow Q$ is a tautology.

Remark. The relations \Leftrightarrow and \Rightarrow occur not just in propositional logic, but in any context in which there are unquantified variables. These symbols can be eliminated by universal quantification over those variables. For example,

1. $(n \text{ is prime} \wedge n > 2) \Rightarrow n \text{ is odd}$ *may be equivalently expressed as:*

$$\forall n [(n \text{ is prime} \wedge n > 2) \rightarrow n \text{ is odd}].$$

2. $f \text{ is differentiable} \Rightarrow f \text{ is continuous}$ *may be equivalently expressed as:*

$$\forall f (f \text{ is differentiable} \rightarrow f \text{ is continuous}).$$

3. $\neg \forall x P(x) \Leftrightarrow \exists x \neg P(x)$ *may be equivalently expressed as:*

$$\forall P [\neg \forall x P(x) \leftrightarrow \exists x \neg P(x)].$$